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ABSTRACT. Firstly I define a hole as a dependent matter-less endurant, which is a little
modification of Casati and Varzi’s definition. Adopting this definition, holes seem to invite
three problems about causation: (1)causal closure, (2)ungrounded disposition and (3)causal
overdetermination. I will defend my definition against all these problems by showing that
holes are limiting cases of physical endurants rather than their opposition and that they have
causal powers in a broad sense.
1 Reification of Holes
C. B. Martin told that holes seemed to have causal powers, showing an example of
‘deadly void’: 1
But now suppose that someone, Alfred, is travelling toward a void, or, better
still, a void is travelling toward Alfred. He would, rightly, fear for his very life
and not because of things around the void but of the inside of the void itself. It
seems that the void has shape and size and motion and terrible causal powers.
In view of these sentences, Martin seems to regard a void as something like a gas
bomb. At the same time, however, he refused to reify a void:2
A void is not a thing, but it may be how a space-time region is.
In spite of this sentence, D. Lewis classified Martin as a nonreductive reifier as well
as R. Casati and A. Varzi (abbreviated to ‘C&V’ henceforth), by pointing out Martin’s
virtual retracting it by his denial that voids are natural properties of things;3 in Lewis’s
view, the universe or space-time is a kind of things and the state of a region or how a
region is is a kind of natural properties.4
? Reprinted from Ontology Meeting: A supplementary volume for 2011, February Meeting, pp.
7-12, Japan Open Research Center for Logic and Formal Ontology, 2011.
1 [Martin 1996], p.62.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., p.58.
4 [Lewis 2004] p.289, n10.
I agree with Lewis in classifying Martin as a nonreductive reifier of holes, except
that for Lewis it was an accusatory judgement, while for me it is rather a welcome,
because I am a nonreductive reifier of holes, differing from Lewis as an eliminativist.
Lewis rejected reifying holes because he disliked ‘spooky’ things like holes.5Probably
that may also have been the reason that made Martin refrain from admitting a hole as
a thing in spite of granting that ‘it has shape and size and motion and terrible causal
powers’. Most other theorists also avoid reifying holes and try to explain the apparent
causal power of holes applying some causal theories: factual theory, counterfactual
theory, quasi-causation theory etc. Against them, I will show that nonreductively reified
holes are not so spooky and that we should admit them causal powers, though they
must surely be limiting cases of powers.
2 Holes as Dependent ‘Matter-less’ Endurants
Using the words ‘the complementary space of X’ as the abbreviation of ‘the comple-
mentary space of the space that X occupies’, I define holes as follows:
A hole is a matter-less endurant that has the power of fillability which emerges
at an externally connected part of the complementary space of some material
bodies, thanks to their shapes and arrangement.
This is a little modification of the view on holes that C&V proposed in their book
Holes and Other Superficialities.6My modification is represented by using the awkward
expression ‘matter-less’ rather than ‘immaterial’;7 while the word ‘immaterial endurant’
brings up the images of ghosts and angels, which are made of, as it were, ‘immaterial
stuff’, I mean by ‘matter-less endurant’ some endurant that is free of any stuff, including
space as stuff. Our difference may be made clear by the following contrast:
[C&V]
Holes are made of space.
A Hole does not rotate. It is like still wine in a rotating wine glass.
[me]
Holes are made of nothing.
A Hole can not rotate. It is like the shadow of a rotating pinwheel.
The proper parts of a hole do not have any criteria of diachronic identity; a hole
keeps its diachronic identity only as a whole. Besides, holes are, as it were, ‘open bodies’;
since the boundary between a hole and its host does not belong to the hole itself but
just to the host, a hole does not necessarily rotate even if its host and the boundary
between them rotate. Therefore holes cannot rotate, in the sense that ‘rotation of a
hole’ is a kind of category mistake and so meaningless. Though it may be doubtful
5 Ibid, p.283.
6 [Casati and Varzi 1994]
7 Probably another (important, if it is,) modification would be the word ‘endurant’, since C&V
seem to be four-dimensionalists and so prefer ‘perdurant’.
that a shadow is a kind of endurants, we can find similar description of some quantum
particles; e.g. the rotation of a one-atom-molecule is also meaningless.
By assimilating holes to shadows and quantum particles rather than ghosts and
angels, we can avoid a dualistic ontology of the material and the immaterial. Holes
are not opposing to physical and natural endurants but their limiting cases. In other
words, we can compare a hole to the empty set; though it is essential for the empty set
to be member-less, it does not follow that it is some opposition to normal member-full
sets; it is just a limiting case of normal sets.
3 ‘Horizontal’ Emergence of Holes
One reward of avoiding dualistic ontology is that we can keep the causation related
with holes within the causal closure of the physical world. However, it invites another
problem; how can a matter-less thing have power or disposition and cause anything?
Usually dispositional properties are grounded by some ‘categorical’ properties of their
subject; e.g. the solubility of sugar is grounded by its molecular structures. That’s why
C&V assigned ‘space’ as the stuff of holes to ground the disposition of fillability, which
they attributed to holes.
According to my definition, the power or disposition of holes ‘emerges’ thanks to the
arrangement and shapes of material bodies. This view originates from C&V. Probably
the only difference between us may be concerning whether we should admit ungrounded
disposition, so-called ‘pure power’.
So my point would be attributing ‘emergent pure power’ to holes. Can it be justified?
It must be admitted that it is a peculiar kind of emergence, since usually emergent
properties and its basic properties belong to the same subject and have the ‘vertical’
relation of macro-micro. In contrast, in the case of holes, the fillability and its basic
property have different subjects: a hole and its host. Moreover, they both lie at the
same level of scale and so we have to say that this case is, as it were, a ‘horizontal’
emergence.
Though it is a unique type of emergence, if it really is, it has what could be called
‘reverse causation’, which corresponds to the ‘downward causation’ in the normal ‘verti-
cal’ emergence; e.g. a hole at the bottom of a ship can make it wrecked and a ventilating
opening of a room keeps its walls and floor dry. In these cases a hole has some effects
on its host, which is the parallel to the downward causation, where emergent properties
affect its basic properties.
Regardless of whether we can take the power of holes as emergent, we cannot deny
that holes act as causes. Martin’s deadly void is a typical example. J. Shaffer also gave
another example in electronics:8
Such electron-hole pair generation is routinely understood as causal: “The
electron absence created by this process is called a hole.” And: “These positively-
charged holes can cause a catastrophic negative shift in the threshold voltage
of the device”(Wall and Macdonald, 1993).
8 [Schaffer 2004] p.203.
As for the ungroundedness of the power of holes, G. Molnar insisted that nobody
had proved that there could not be ungrounded powers. He described the power of
some subatomic particles as the possible examples of ungrounded power.9 Of course
there are many differences between the power of subatomic particles and that of holes;
according to a traditional distinction, the former is an active power, while the latter
may be a passive power or a liability. Besides, the former is doubtlessly intrinsic to
its subject, while the latter has to be extrinsic trivially, because it follows from my
definition of a hole that it cannot exist without its host, which means that the power
of a hole cannot exist without entities other than its subject.
However, the distinction between an active power and a passive one may not be
metaphysical but just conventional; J. McKitrick insisted that the fragility of some
material, which was a typical liability, could contribute to the active power of explo-
siveness, when the material was used as a component of a bomb.10 Martin’s deadly
void is also the case where an ordinary passive fillability changes into an extreme ac-
tive power. For another example, we could interpret the disposition of water absorbency
both as active and passive. McKitrick also gave the examples of extrinsic dispositions
such as weight, vulnerability and visibility.11 Generally speaking, it is my strategy to
accept the power of holes by adopting McKitrick’s ‘dispositional pluralism’:12
Dispositional terms attribute a wide variety of kinds of properties to objects:
intrinsic and extrinsic properties, reducible and irreducible properties, essential
and non-essential properties, natural and unnatural properties.
Our disposition ascriptions are neutral with respect to whether the disposi-
tions are reducible or irreducible, bare or grounded, essential or non-essential,
inert or efficacious.
Surely the fillability is a very unique disposition and we should say that it is a
limiting case of dispositions. It may be instructive here to remind that Hume regarded
the solidity or impenetrability of material bodies as a secondary or dispositional quality
against Locke, who classified it as a primary or categorical quality.13 Solidity might be
also a limitng case of dispositions which is at the opposite side of fillability.
4 Holes and Supervenience
Finally let us consider the causal overdetermination related with holes. Basically the
dependence of a hole upon its host is a weak dependence in the sense that it is not
specific but generic; it does not require any ‘specific’ material body but only ‘some’
9 [Molnar 2003] pp.125-142.
10 [McKitrick 2009] p189.
11 [McKitrick 2003] p.159.
12 [McKitrick 2009] p191,195. G. Ryle and N. Cartwright also had similar views: [Ryle 1949]
p.198, [Cartwright 1999] p.64.
13 [Hume 1978] I. iv. 4, pp.208-209.
material one to exist. So Tutankhamen’s nostrils survived his death by his being mum-
mified, though I am not sure whether his soul also did. However, we cannot deny that
a hole ‘supervenes’ upon its host in the sense that a hole cannot change its shape with-
out changing the shape of its host. Therefore we cannot avoid the problem of causal
overdetermination which J. Kim most perspicuously pointed out in the context of the
philosophy of mind.14
The concept of supervenience is ambiguous and its implication on the ontological
dependence and causation is not clear. Moreover, it is arguable that Kim’s criticism of
nonreductive physicalism of mind may have some defects. Keeping away from these big
questions, however, I want to cling to the fact that the way of supervenience of a hole
upon its host is different from that of a mind upon a body; the difference that I showed
concerning the horizontal emergence of holes can be applied to the supervenience of
holes. So Kim’s argument may not be applicable to the supervenience of holes.
Actually I could give a proof that a hole is a cause of some event even though it
supervenes upon its host; now suppose that someone stumbled over a stone on the
ground. In that case the stone is the cause of her falling. Next suppose that there was
a bump which has the same shape and size with the stone just described and that
someone stumbled over the bump. In this case the bump is similarly the cause of his
falling. Finally suppose that somebody missed her step upon a hole and fell down. In
this case we would have to say that the hole is the cause of her stumbling.
Here it is to be noted that the shape of the bump supervenes upon that of the
ground. In spite of this, we should say that it is the cause of someone’s falling down in
the same way the stone is the cause of another’s stumbling. Then we should say that
the hole is also the cause of someone’s falling down even if its shape supervenes upon
that of its host, that is, the ground. I believe that this case is a counterexample to the
thesis that the supervenience of a hole makes its power redundant.
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